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In January 2016, the Canadian infrastructure company TransCanada 
Corporation filed a notice of intent to sue the United States government in a 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter 11 arbitration over 
the Keystone XL pipeline. 1 At the center of this dispute is the State 
Department's refusal to permit the construction of an oil pipeline between 
Canada and Nebraska. TransCanada claims that the State Department ignored 
its own favorable environmental assessments of the pipeline multiple times and 
rejected the proposal to placate misinformed activists and foreign 
governments. 2 The State Department acknowledges that it denied the permit 
to enhance the Obama Administration's credibility at the 2015 United Nations 
Climate Change Conference in Paris, with the long-term goal of reducing 
emissions through collective political action. 3 
This Essay situates the TransCanada arbitration within the history of 
investment arbitration, highlighting recent collisions between arbitral regimes 
and the modern regulatory state. After briefly discussing the history of 
investment arbitration, we discuss in depth the collision's most startling fallout 
so far- the Clayton v. Canada award on liability. Finally, we suggest how the 
TransCanada tribunal should view the Clayton award. 
1. Notice ef Intent To Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 ef 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, TRANSCANADA CORP. (Jan. 6, 2016), 
http://www.keystone-xl.com/wp-content/u ploads/ 2016/ 01/TransCanada-Notice-of-Intent 
-January-6-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/2WUT-LY4S] [hereinafter Notice] (Chapter 11 is 
NAFTA's investment chapter, which provides rights and remedies for investors in NAFTA 
countries; it represents the first major merger of an investment agreement with a free trade 
area). 
2. Id.'[ 47. 
3. DEP'T OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATION: 
TRANSCANADA KEYSTONE PIPELINE, L.P. APPLICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT (1015), 
http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/249450.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/KKE5-TNZV]. 
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The current litigation over the Keystone pipeline must be situated within 
the longer history of investment arbitration. Investment arbitration previously 
governed relations between investors from capital-exporting, developed 
democracies and governments of developing, mainly post-colonial countries.4 
A cousin of "diplomatic protection,'' it was first used to protect colonial 
investments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 5 After the 
decolonization of the twentieth century, investment arbitration became a tool 
of economic development for the newly christened "developing world": foreign 
capital was believed to need special protection in order to flow into areas 
subject to ongoing economic and political uncertainty. 6 Bilateral investment 
treaties - the state-to-state agreements permitting investor-to-state 
arbitration - sought to establish minimally fair and equitable treatment for 
investments in countries where self-dealing autocrats might seize all of a 
foreign investor's property or ruling nationalist parties might view investment 
from abroad with hostility in the context of recently concluded anticolonial 
struggles. But beginning in the 1960s, both the United Nations and the World 
Bank established rules and institutions to administer standardized investment 
arbitrations. While these were initially focused on the developing world, the 
mechanism gradually came into more general use. 7 As this new form oflegality 
spread, even developed states with sophisticated judicial systems found 
themselves defending against claims of investment expropriation. 8 
The result is that developed democracies are now being targeted under a 
system of arbitration they had designed for use elsewhere. The translation of 
4. For example, the first bilateral investment treaty with investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) was the Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Ger.-Pak., art. 11, 
'[ 2, Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24 (entered into force Nov. 28, 1962). 
5. ANDREW NEWCOMB & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES § 1.5 
(1009). Diplomatic protection differs crucially from investor-state dispute resolution in that 
diplomatic protection involved states bringing claims on behalf of their injured nationals. 
Investment arbitration may represent a delegation of this power to the injured nationals, 
thereby privatizing tliis aspect of foreign relations, or a coexisting remedial scheme. See 
Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Independent 
Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1, 1-3 (1014); cf. Opinion with 
Respect to Jurisdiction of W. Michael Reisman, Ecuador v. United States, Case No. 
2012-05, 20-21 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Apr. 24, 2012), http://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/582 
[http://perma.cc/8KMU-6Z5G] (arguing for a "two-track" regime witli sovereign-to-
sovereign and investor-state dispute settlement). 
6. See Mattias Kumm, An Empire ef Capital? Transatlantic Investment Protection as the 
Institutionalization if Unjustified Privilege, 4 EUR. Soc'YINT'LL. REFLECTIONS 1, 2-4 (1015). 
7. In the past few decades, the number ofbilateral investment treaties has exploded, increasing 
from 457 in 1990 to 2,926 at the time of publication. See International Investment Agreements 
Navigator (Advanced Search), UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [http://perma.cc/ 6G9P-5Y 9X]. 
8. For a fuller discussion of this reversal, see Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent 
and Limits if Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 358-62 (1015). 
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the old investment arbitration paradigm into one that enables lawsuits against 
the governments of developed countries has dramatically changed the arbitral 
landscape. Under the current dispensation, corporations headquartered in 
stable, liberal democracies bring claims against the regulatory policies of other 
stable, liberal democracies using the court systems of neither. For instance, 
either the United States or Canada has been the target in fifty-eight out of 
eighty-one NAFTA Chapter 11 investment arbitrations in twenty-two years, 
and the opposing party is usually a U.S. or Canadian corporation. 9 Australia 
only recently saw the end of a long-running dispute with Philip Morris over a 
public health measure that the tobacco company deemed an expropriation. 10 
Claims of this kind will likely increase in the future: the controversial Trans-
Pacific Partnership, if passed, will double the number of investors who can 
bring suit against the United States. 11 
As investment arbitration has grown to encompass both developing 
countries and developed democracies, the scope of review has expanded. 
Where arbitration tribunals originally focused on outright expropriation of 
private investments, they are increasingly called upon to review regulatory 
actions that negatively impact the profits of foreign investors. 12 Recent cases 
have concerned new environmental measures, 13 the regulation of nuclear 
power,14 changes to fiscal regimes, 15 the scope of patent protection for 
9. Table if Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims Under NAFTA and Other U.S. "Trade" Deals, 
PUB. CITIZEN (June 2015), http://www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/M5YC-7CX3]. 
10. Phillip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files 
/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y4TX-VC~4]. The decision will be 
published pending redaction of confidential information. 
11. Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs & Jeffrey Sachs, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public 
Interest and U.S. Domestic Law, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. 
5 (May 2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement 
-Public-Interest-and-U .S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf [http://perma.cc/3DZ6 
-AGDA]. 
12. Id. at 2-3; see also cases cited irifra notes 13-17. 
13. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2009), http:// 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf[http://perma.cc/QpW3-GKZR]; Lone 
Pine Res. Inc. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, Claimant's Memorial (Apr. 10, 
2015), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= CasesRH&action Val 
=showDoc&docld=DC5878 _En&caseld=C4406 [http://perma.cc/7HFD-N GBA J. 
14. Vattenfall AB v. Fed. Republic of Ger., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Award 
(Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itao890.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/K3RX-PZ25]. 
15. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 
Award (Oct. 5, 2012), http://icsid.worldbank.org/I CSID /FrontServlet?requestType 
= CasesRH&action Val= showDoc&docld= DC2672 _ En&caseld= C8 o [ http://perma.cc/3KU A 
-VA8G]. 
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pharmaceuticals, 16 and the restructuring of sovereign debt. 17 While plaintiffs in 
domestic eminent domain and "regulatory takings" cases have very low success 
rates of around four percent, 18 complainants in arbitrations of expropriation 
and indirect claims have success rates around forty percent. 19 
As the scope of investment arbitration has expanded, so has the conception 
of the "minimum standard of treatment" by which government actions are 
judged. In the context of NAFTA arbitrations -in which the litigation over the 
Keystone XL pipeline will be decided- this shift has been highlighted in a 
recently concluded dispute, Clayton v. Canada. 20 The Clayton Award makes 
apparent the deficit of legitimacy when an ad hoc, international arbitral panel 
evaluates the conformity of a country's domestic laws with its treaty 
obligations. Interestingly, while the majority decision arguably undermines 
Canadian sovereignty, its language pays constant tribute to the Canadian 
people's power to make and pass laws consistent with its values. Clayton is thus 
not a caricature of neoliberal jurisprudence21 : the Award did not simply deny 
Canada's power to make laws that interfere with expectations of corporate 
profit. Instead, it was anxious to accommodate democratic sovereignty at every 
step. But, we argue below, it failed to do so when it abandoned its commitment 
to democratic sovereignty in the application of several review standards to the 
facts. 22 Clayton thus shows investment arbitration at an impasse: divided 
between a minimalist conception in which it merely serves as a buffer for 
multinational corporations against corrupt government officials, and an 
expanded role in which it becomes a forum for the recognition of foreign 
16. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Claimant's 
Memorial (Sept. 29, 2014), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType 
= CasesRH&action Val= showDoc&docld= DC49 83_ En&caseld= C3544 [ http://perma.cc 
/MX8W-XTK7]. 
17. Abaclat et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB 07/5, Decision on Admissibility 
and Jurisdiction, '['[ 8-10 (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case 
-documents/ita0236.pdf [http://perma.cc/2MUD-XPG5]. 
18. Adam R. Pomeroy, Penn Central After 35 Years: A Three Part Balancing Test or a One Strike 
Rule, 22 FED CIR. B.J. 677, 698 (2012). 
19. See Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 
51 VA. J. INT'L L. 825, 852 (2011). The comparison between domestic regulatory takings and 
expropriation is a rough one, given the different contexts. 
20. See, e.g., Clayton v. Government of Canada, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Case No. 
2009-04, '['[ 601-602 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach 
/1287 [http://perma.cc/WXB8-WL89 J [hereinafter Award]. 
21. For an analysis of neoliberalism in its legal aspects, see David Singh Grewal & Jedediah 
Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-23, 2 (1015) 
("Neoliberalism is an overlapping set of arguments and premises ... that are united by their 
tendency to support market imperatives and unequal economic power in the context of 
political conflicts that are characteristic of the present historical moment.") 
22. See irifra discussion accompanying notes 33-42. 
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interests in the review of domestic laws. 23 In the Essay's final section, we argue 
that the TransCanada tribunal should reject the latter approach. 
The Clayton claims centered on a proposal for a marine quarry in Nova 
Scotia that Canadian environmental assessors found could not proceed without 
causing irreparable damage to the land, marine, and human environments in 
the Digby Neck and Whites Point areas, including the local fishing and 
aboriginal populations. 24 Technically, the Clayton family claimed that Canada 
had violated three different NAFTA provisions: the Article 1105 guarantee of 
fair and equitable treatment for foreign investors, the Article 1102 guarantee of 
treatment no worse than Canadian investors ("national treatment"), and the 
Article 1103 guarantee of treatment no worse than investors from any other 
nation ("most favored nation"). In a contentious 2-1 decision, the tribunal 
found that Canada had breached its NAFTA commitments by failing to treat 
the corporate complainant- Bilcon of Delaware, Inc., owned by the Clayton 
family-fairly, equitably, and consistently with other corporations. Put simply, 
a majority of the tribunal held the Canadian government liable for having a 
different view of Canadian law than the arbitrators themselves. 25 
The Clayton Award represents the high water mark of the new investment 
arbitration: with Bilcon asking for as much as $300 million, the judgment for 
the corporate complainant could be the largest monetary award granted to any 
complainant in the history of Chapter 11 arbitrations when the tribunal 
eventually issues an award on damages. 26 Although the case involved three 
claims - under Articles 1102, 1103, and 1105- they all essentially turned on one 
determination: whether the Canadian joint review panel (JRP) could consider 
"community core values" in its report, and whether such considerations could 
be the basis for rejecting a project whose effects on the non-human 
environment were potentially mitigatable. 27 If so, then Canada merely followed 
its own law-consistent with the investors' expectations that the project must 
"comply with federal and provincial laws concerning the environment"28 -
which would satisfy the requirement of fair, equitable, and non-differential 
treatment. But if the JRP could not properly consider community values, then 
23. See Kumm, supra note 6, at 6. 
24. Clayton v. Government of Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting Opinion of Professor 
Donald McRae, '['[ 22-26 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), http://www.pcacases.com/web 
/sendAttach/1288 [http://perma.cc/N 68F-95EF J [hereinafter Dissent J. 
25. See id. '['[ 34-35. 
26. John DeMings, Bilcon Wins NAFTA Dispute Over Digby Neck Q!tarry, DIGBY COUNTY 
COURIER (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.digbycourier.ca/News/Regional/2015-03-21/article 
-4085504/Bilcon-wins-NAFTA-dispute-over-Digby-N eek-quarry/ 1 [http ://perma.cc/Q§U 5 
-JJWX]. The Clayton tribunal has not yet rendered a damages award. 
27. See Award, supra note 20, '[ 323. 
28. Id. '[ 589. 
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its conduct might represent an Article 1105 violation if it could be deemed 
"grossly unfair, unjust, or idiosyncratic" or would "lead ... to an outcome 
which offends judicial propriety."29 Such a violation could also qualify as a 
most-favored nation and national treatment violation: Canada cannot treat 
foreign corporations grossly unjustly when it has not subjected domestic 
corporations to the same injustices -which, arguably, it had not done, since it 
was the novel application of the law that created the gross injustice in the first 
analysis. 30 
It is true that a variety of state actions do not rise to the level of "grossly 
unfair, unjust, or idiosyncratic" or otherwise "offend[] judicial propriety,'' but 
these actions might nevertheless give rise to colorable claims ofliability against 
the state. 31 A line of NAFTA Chapter 11 cases - and even Clayton itself- go to 
great lengths to recognize that actions within this range do not count as 
violations of Article 1105. Article 1105 only imposes a "minimum standard of 
treatment,'' independent of any particular national laws. 32 Otherwise, state 
actions subject to any potential legal challenge could become a boon to foreign 
investors, who would exclusively enjoy the benefits of this relaxed legal 
standard. The Clayton Award was unusual in that it disregarded previously 
established NAFTA Chapter 11 practices of distinguishing between a state's 
outright expropriation of an investor's property, a state's mere unlawful 
conduct, and a state's following a reasonable view of its own laws. Absent these 
distinctions, the arbitral tribunal-whose judgment cannot be appealed in U.S. 
or Canadian courts33 - becomes, in effect, a national court of last resort with 
jurisdiction over not only questions of egregious deviations from international 
standards of fair treatment, but also proper interpretations of domestic law. 34 
29. Id. '[ 400 (quoting Mobil Investments Canada Inc. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/04, Decision on Liability and on Principles of ~antum, '['[ 152-53 (May 22, 
2012)). 
30. Id. '[ 715. ("[T]he emphasis on 'community core values' raises the serious question of 
whether the project would have received more favorable treatment if the investor had not 
been foreign."). 
31. Id. '[ 400 (quoting Mobil Investments Canada Inc. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/04, Decision on Liability and on Principles of ~antum, '['[ 152-53 (May 22, 
2012)). 
32. Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/oo/3, Award, '['[ 98-99 
(Apr. 30, 2004), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itao900.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4AFS-DAYV] [hereinafter Waste Management]. Here the Clayton tribunal, 
operating under the UNCITRAL rules, cited to an award under ICSID rules. Such cross-
pollination is not uncommon. 
33. Awards under the UNCITRAL rules-lil<:e Clayton-can be set aside under certain 
circumstances. Awards under the ICSID rules-lil<:e TransCanada will be-can be set aside 
only under very limited circumstances. 
34. See Letter from Judith Resnil<:, Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch., et 
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In the Clayton dispute, the laws in question concerned the JRP's administrative 
prerogatives; in the coming TransCanada litigation, they might even require an 
assessment of the President's constitutional authority. 35 
Even as the Clayton majority collapsed the distinction between arguable 
violations of domestic law and violations of the independently established 
minimum standard specific to foreign investor-state relationships, it reiterated 
the concerns that had motivated the distinction between these two standards in 
the first place. Indeed, the Award forcefully defended the sovereignty of 
Canadian lawmakers in principle: 
Lawmakers in Canada . . . can set environmental standards as 
demanding and broad as they wish and can vest in various 
administrative bodies whatever mandates they wish. Errors, even 
substantial errors, in applying national laws do not generally . . . rise to the 
level of international responsibility vis-a-vis foreign investors. 36 
To use investment arbitration to attack such policies would be an affront to 
the legitimate lawmaking process: investor arbitration, the tribunal explained, 
is "not supposed to be the continuation of domestic politics and litigation by 
other means."37 One implication of these commitments is to allow 
administrative agencies the discretion to make factual and evaluative decisions 
consistent with the statutory regime. As the Clayton majority put it directly: 
Modern regulatory and social welfare states tackle complex problems. 
Not all situations can be addressed in advance by the laws that are 
enacted. Room must be left for judgment to be used to interpret legal 
standards and apply them to the facts .... [W]hen state officials are 
acting in good faith there will sometimes be not only controversial 
judgments, but clear-cut mistakes in following procedures .... [This J 
imprudent exercise of discretion or even outright mistake do [es J not, as a rule, 
lead to a breach of the international minimum standard. 38 
Accordingly, Clayton_ attempted to follow the interpretation of NAFTA 
Article 1105 developed in a previous arbitration, Waste Management. 39 Under 
the Waste Management standard, the "minimum standard of fair and equitable 
treatment is infringed by conduct ... [that] is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust 
30, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2015/04/30 
/Editorial-Opinion/Graphics/oppose_ISDS _Letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/5XZU-Z22L J. 
35. See irifra discussion accompanying notes 53-58. 
36. Award, supra note 20, '[ 738 (emphasis added). 
37. Id. '[ 437· 
38. Id. (emphasis added). 
39. See id. '['[ 442-43. 
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or idiosyncratic ... or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome 
which offends judicial propriety."40 This standard is more lenient than those 
adopted by previous NAFTA tribunals, which have traditionally required 
"egregious" and "outrageous" state action.41 But it is still a strict standard, 
requiring more than a possible violation of domestic law. 
When the Clayton majority applied the Waste Management standard to the 
facts of the dispute, it did so in a manner that defeated its self-proclaimed 
respect for domestic sovereignty. The majority declared the JRP findings 
"arbitrary" because the review panel had not conducted a "likely significant 
adverse effects after mitigation" analysis, under which potential mitigation of a 
project's environmental effects might save an otherwise rejected project.42 The 
JRP had declined to do so because the proposed project's effects on the human 
environment- including on the local fishing and aboriginal populations, which 
did not meet with any representatives of Bilcon43 -were deemed too extreme. 
In arriving at its decision, the Clayton majority abandoned the other language 
from Waste Management (i.e. "grossly unfair") and interpreted "arbitrary" as a 
mere possible violation of Canadian law. 44 Indeed, the Award "simply holds 
that the applicant was not treated in a manner consistent with Canada's own 
laws"45 on the basis of two arbitrators' interpretation of Canadian law. This 
forms the sole basis for a finding of an Article 1105 violation. 
It remains far from obvious whether Canada's environmental assessment 
statutes require review panels to report on potential mitigation measures, 
especially when a project's impact on the human environment cannot be 
mitigated. The statutes authorizing the review-the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act and Nova Scotia Environments Act- both explicitly authorize 
the consideration of effects on the human environment, including on the 
current use of land by indigenous groups.46 The Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act requires an evaluation, by a minister or review panel, of the 
environmental effects of a somewhat narrow class of construction and 
infrastructure projects with connections to the federal government. 47 The Act 
instructs the panel to consider as environmental effects "any change ... on (i) 
health and socio-economic conditions, (ii) physical and cultural heritage, (iii) the 
40. Waste Management, supra note 32, '[ 98. 
41. Award, supra note 20, '['[ 36, 434. 
42. Id. '[ 591. 
43. Dissent, supra note 24, '[ 25. 
44. Award, supra note 20, '[ 602. 
45. Id. 
46. NOVASCOTIAENV'TACT, S.N.S. 1994-5, c.1, sec. (3)(v)(i). 
47. CANADIAN ENVT'L. ASSESSMENT ACT, S.C. 1992, c. 37. 
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current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes by aboriginal persons."48 
The Nova Scotia Environments Act uses the same language. Although the 
Clayton Award cited some of this statutory language, it never addressed why 
that language clearly prohibits the conclusion that effects on the human 
environment may preclude the possibility of mitigating non-human 
environmental degradation. The majority instead simply argued that since no 
review panel had previously used a similar strategy, the panel's decision could 
not be consistent with investors' legitimate expectations.49 
The Clayton Award will be welcomed by investors who may now claim 
breaches of laws not yet fully specified by Canadian courts or who allege that 
Canadian law does not meet an international minimum standard of treatment. 
However, the Award is inconsistent with the principled respect for democratic 
sovereignty with which the majority began its analysis. At the conceptual level, 
the Award claims to uphold the importance of democratic control over national 
laws, but it strips this commitment of meaning in its actual application to the 
facts. It seeks to serve two inconsistent goals: upholding a conception of 
investment arbitration as providing minimal fairness, consistent with 
democratic sovereignty, and carving out a special privilege for foreign investors 
to use what may prove favorable versions of domestic law. 
The Clayton majority functionally pursued the latter aim despite its 
forthright anxiety about its own democratic legitimacy. Unlike the majority, 
the impassioned dissent in Clayton recognized the true significance of the 
tribunal's approach: the decision presented "a significant intrusion into 
domestic jurisdiction" and would "chill" Canadian administrative law. 50 It put 
the "proper application of Canadian law by an environmental review panel ... 
in[to] the hands of a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal, importing a damages 
remedy that is not available under Canadian law."51 By expanding a damages 
remedy available only to foreign corporate litigants in privatized litigation, the 
Clayton Award has confirmed the fear that special investor-state dispute 
48. Id. at sec. 2. (emphasis added). Likewise, when Lee Clark, Member of Parliament and 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of the Environment, introduced the bill in 
Parliamentary debate in 1992, he emphasized the bill's broad coverage: it would "make 
environmental factors equal partners ... with social and economic concerns." HOUSE OF 
COMMONS DEBATES, 34th Parl., 3rd Sess., vol. 7, at 8373 (Mar. 17, 1992) (statement of Lee 
Clark, Member, Parliament) (emphasis added), http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop 
.debates_HOC3403_ 07/299 ?r=o&s=l [http://perma.cc/VQ§E-SKQb J. 
49. See, e.g., Award, supra note 20, '[ 573. 
50. Dissent, supra note 24, '[ 48. 
51. Id. 
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mechanisms can undermine democracy and the rule oflaw. 52 Ironically, it does 
so in spite of the majority's robust rhetorical support for these very principles. 
Clayton has significant parallels with the TransCanada litigation. Both 
involve the denial of a permit for a large infrastructure project by an 
administrative agency that determined that the project passed particular 
quantitative environmental impact tests but nonetheless had to be rejected on 
other policy grounds. Like the use of "community core values" by the JRP in 
Clayton, the State Department's use of the U.N. Climate Change talks to justify 
the Keystone XL permit denial is unique, but far from unforeseeable. The 
relevant Executive Order grants the State Department broad authority to deny 
permits not in the "national interest."53 Moreover, the State Department's role 
in the U.S. government provides a substantial clue that its view of the "national 
interest" might include managing foreign relations to enable global collective 
action on climate change. 
As in Clayton, the TransCanada arbitration will turn on whether the United 
States violated Articles 1102, 1103, 1105 and 1110 of NAFTA, which promise 
non-discrimination, fair and equitable treatment, and compensation for 
expropriation to Canadian investors by the United States. In support of these 
claims, TransCanada's Notice of Intent alleges that the State Department 
unjustifiably delayed its review of the pipeline, and implies that it exceeded the 
authority delegated by the President. 54 Although we do not know exactly what 
arguments TransCanada will make to the arbitral tribunal, the corporation has 
revealed its likely strategy in a parallel civil complaint filed in the Southern 
District of Texas. 55 That strategy shares the conceptual commitments of the 
Clayton tribunal in seeking to base a NAFTA violation on a precise 
interpretation of a broad domestic legal rule-in this case, the U.S. 
Constitution. In its civil complaint, TransCanada argues that the State 
Department's permit denial is an unconstitutional assertion of executive power, 
and therefore violates NAFTA obligations. Drawing on Justice Jackson's 
legendary concurrence in Youngstown Steel, TransCanada argues that President 
Obama has acted at the "lowest ebb" of his power by denying a permit for a 
pipeline that Congress itself tried to authorize in 2014 before being stymied by 
52. New developments may bring ISDS in line with democratic values. See, for example, the 
Comprehensive Economics and Trade Agreement, 8.18(2), which limits ISDS claims to 
"existing business operations of a covered investment." 
53. See Exec. Order No. 13,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299 (May 5, 2004). 
54. Notice, supra note 1, '['[ 51-60. 
55. TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP v. John Kerry, Complaint, Case 4:16-cv-00036 (S.D. 
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a presidential veto. 56 In the company's view, this allegedly unconstitutional 
exercise of presidential power is tantamount to a NAFTA violation. In the 
alternative, TransCanada argues that the State Department exceeded any 
authority that the President has or could have delegated. 57 As the civil 
complaint summarizes, "given the unprecedented basis for and nature of the 
denial of the Presidential Permit for construction and operation of the 
Keystone XL Pipeline, the denial is arbitrary and frustrated plaintiffs' 
legitimate investment expectations."58 
To those readers unfamiliar with the operation of investor-state 
arbitration, it may seem strange to charge an ad hoc tribunal with deciding the 
legality of the State Department's actions under the U.S. Constitution or an 
Executive Order. But TransCanada can point to a growing body of investment 
arbitration awards that base violations of investors' legitimate expectations on 
interpretations of domestic law. By making a constitutional argument, 
TransCanada seeks to focus the tribunal on an exercise of constitutional 
interpretation, rather than on the State Department's broad and well-known 
power to reject permits inconsistent with the "national interest,"59 or on the 
obvious risk that the pipeline would be rejected on other grounds. 
The use of ad hoc tribunals to judge constitutional matters appears to be 
the unfortunate next step in an increasingly intrusive jurisprudence of 
investment arbitration. Instead of deepening the mistake made in Clayton, we 
believe the tribunal considering the Keystone XL litigation should hew to the 
spirit of older NAFTA Chapter 11 cases in deciding the Article 1105 fair and 
equitable treatment claim. 60 The tribunal should ask itself whether the State 
Department's denial of the permit was egregious, outrageous, or completely 
unforeseeable. This is the relevant question, and no answer should assume that 
states must rely only on policy considerations that have already been fully and 
formally elaborated in domestic statutes and legal decisions. 61 Such an 
assumption would limit states to using yesterday's solutions for tomorrow's 
problems. By declining to go down that route, the TransCanada tribunal can 
resurrect the deference to democracy given merely rhetorical effect in Clayton. 
56. Complaint, supra note 55, '[ 69. 
57. Id. '['[ 93-122. 
58. Id. '[ 81. 
59. Exec. Order No. 13,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299 (May 5, 2004). 
60. Strategic considerations, like the desire to legitimate ISDS to Canadians or Americans 
during the course of treaty negotiations, may influence the tribunal in either direction. See 
David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an 
Explanation for Coriflicting Outcomes, 30 Nw. J. INT'L L. &Bus. 383, 404-06 (1010 ). 
61. Cf Saluka Inv. BV (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, '[ 305 (UNCITRAL 2006) 
("No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the 
investment is made remain totally unchanged."). 
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